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How should the accuracy of eyewitness identification decisions be measured, so that best practices for identification
can be determined? This fundamental question is under intense debate. One side advocates for continued use of a
traditional measure of identification accuracy, known as the diagnosticity ratio, whereas the other side argues that
receiver operating characteristic curves (ROCs) should be used instead because diagnosticity is confounded with
response bias. Diagnosticity proponents have offered several criticisms of ROCs, which we show are either false or
irrelevant to the assessment of eyewitness accuracy. We also show that, like diagnosticity, Bayesian measures of
identification accuracy confound response bias with witnesses’ ability to discriminate guilty from innocent suspects.
ROCs are an essential tool for distinguishing memory-based processes from decisional aspects of a response;
simulations of different possible identification tasks and response strategies show that they offer important constraints
on theory development.
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DiagnosticitySignificance
Eyewitness identifications can provide compelling evidence
in criminal cases. For decades, researchers have explored
the factors that influence the accuracy of those memory
judgments, including consideration of both system vari-
ables that are controlled by the legal system (e.g., identifica-
tion procedures and instructions) and estimator variables
that are intrinsic to the witness’s experience of the crime
(e.g., viewing distance, stress). The accuracy of the identifi-
cation itself has almost always been summarized with a
measure known as diagnosticity, which is simply a ratio of
correct and incorrect identification probabilities. Crucially,
recent research has demonstrated that diagnosticity is con-
founded with witnesses’ willingness to identify a suspect,
raising questions about the validity of prior conclusions
about the effects of system and estimator variables. Those
conclusions rest on the assumption that manipulations of
these variables affect only the accuracy of the identification,
but the diagnosticity measure cannot distinguish between* Correspondence: caren@psych.umass.edu
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ness to identify. More appropriate measures of eyewitness
identification accuracy can be obtained from receiver
operating characteristic curves (ROCs) based on confidence
ratings. Although ROCs have a long and productive history
in many domains of psychological research (including rec-
ognition memory), their application to eyewitness identifi-
cation decisions has been challenged. In this paper, we
correct some of the conceptual errors in the literature on
identification ROCs, and demonstrate their value for both
understanding the factors that influence eyewitness identifi-
cation accuracy and constraining theoretical development.Measuring eyewitness information accuracy
How should the accuracy of eyewitness identification deci-
sions be measured so that best practices for identification
can be determined? This fundamental question is under
intense debate. One side of the argument (e.g., Wells,
Yang, & Smalarz, 2015a) is that the probative measure that
has been used for decades, namely the ratio of correct
identifications of guilty suspects to false identifications of
innocent suspects (i.e., hit rate/false alarm rate =H/F;is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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measure of eyewitness accuracy. This ratio is known as
the diagnosticity ratio, or simply as diagnosticity. The
other side of the argument is that diagnosticity is con-
founded with witnesses’ tendency to identify someone;
that is, to “choose” from the lineup (e.g., Wixted &
Mickes, 2012). To the extent that this response bias varies
across identification procedures, diagnosticity will also
vary, even if witnesses are equally able to discriminate
guilty from innocent suspects. For this reason, basing a
preference for a particular identification procedure on an
observed difference in diagnosticity ratios (e.g., Steblay,
Dysart, & Wells, 2011) is a deeply flawed approach.
An alternative to the diagnosticity ratio is to use the
confidence ratings that are routinely collected with identi-
fication decisions to construct ROCs (e.g., Mickes, Flowe,
& Wixted, 2012; Wixted & Mickes, 2012). In the context
of eyewitness identifications, ROCs usually plot the prob-
ability of a correct identification of a guilty suspect (H)
against the probability of a false identification of an inno-
cent suspect (F) at each confidence level or response bias.
By definition, the empirical points on any given ROC dif-
fer only in terms of response bias, whereas ROC that fall
higher in the space reflect greater ability to discriminate
guilty from innocent suspects because the hit rate is
higher for any particular false alarm rate. Levi (2016, p.
45) claimed that “[an eyewitness] ROC fails to produce a
discriminability measure,” and Wells et al. (2015a, p. 118)
wrote that “it is not clear that the ROC approach is prop-
erly controlling for response bias or that it measures dis-
criminability.” Both claims are wrong. In fact, that is
exactly what ROCs do.
A good quantitative measure of discrimination accuracy
that is independent of response bias is the area under the
ROC (AUC) (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creel-
man, 2005; Pollack & Hsieh, 1969). For eyewitness identi-
fication tasks, a partial area under the curve (pAUC) is
typically reported because the false alarm rate is naturally
limited by the number of photographs in the lineup,
resulting in a curve that does not extend across the entire
x-axis (e.g., Mickes et al., 2012). The AUC and pAUC
measure the ability of witnesses to discriminate between
the two classes of stimuli that are summarized on the x-
and y-axes, independently of response bias. For example,
if identifications of guilty suspects are plotted on the y-
axis and identifications of innocent suspects on the x-axis,
then the area under the curve reflects the ability of
witnesses to distinguish between guilty and innocent sus-
pects. This measure of discrimination is crucial for deter-
mining which identification procedure results in the
highest-accuracy classifications of suspects as either guilty
or innocent. On the other hand, if the x-axis includes any
positive identification from a target absent (TA) lineup
(including filler identifications), as Wells and colleaguesproposed (Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015b; Wells, Smith,
& Smalarz, 2015c), then the AUC reflects the ability of
witnesses to discriminate guilty suspects (in a target
present [TP] lineup) from everybody in the TA lineup. We
do not see the relevance of this measure for policy makers,
the legal system, or eyewitness researchers. However, ob-
served differences between this AUC (which measures dis-
crimination of a guilty suspect from all the fillers in the
TA lineup) and the AUC derived from an ROC that plots
identifications of guilty and innocent suspects have been
used as a criticism of eyewitness ROCs. We will elaborate
this point shortly.
The best measure of eyewitnesses’ ability to discrimin-
ate guilty from innocent suspects is one that does not
conflate decision accuracy and response bias. Factors
such as the base rate of lineups that contain a guilty sus-
pect, or the costs and benefits of correct and erroneous
identification decisions (i.e., falsely identifying an inno-
cent suspect; failing to identify a guilty suspect), contrib-
ute to determining the optimal decision criterion or
response bias (i.e., the criterion location that maximizes
the expected value of the decision; Macmillan & Creel-
man, 2005, Equation 2.8). However, these factors do not
have any bearing on an appropriate measure of discrim-
ination. The AUC is one such measure.
ROC analyses of eyewitness identifications have been
roundly criticized (e.g., Lampinen, 2016; Wells et al.,
2015b). Indeed, Levi (2016) wrote that “researchers are
warned against using ROC[s] when conducting lineup
research” (p. 42). One primary argument against ROCs
is that witness responses fall into three categories (iden-
tify a suspect, identify a filler, or reject the lineup), but
ROCs require the data to be collapsed into two categor-
ies (positive and negative responses; Wells et al., 2015b).
Because suspect identifications are of primary interest to
law enforcement, virtually all reported ROCs have com-
bined filler identifications and lineup rejections into the
set of negative responses, leaving only suspect identifica-
tions as positive responses. This treatment of the data is
exactly the same as is used in the calculation of the diag-
nosticity ratio (Wells & Lindsay, 1980, Equation 6), so
the fact that data are collapsed is not a criticism of
ROCs per se.1 Indeed, as we suggested earlier, we believe
that ROCs based only on suspect identifications are pre-
cisely the data needed to assess witnesses’ ability to dis-
criminate guilty from innocent suspects independently
of their willingness to identify someone.
An intimately related argument is that collapsing filler
identifications with lineup rejections ignores “filler
siphoning.” Filler siphoning is the observation that errone-
ous identifications in a showup procedure (or a strongly
biased lineup) all implicate the innocent suspect, whereas
in a fair lineup procedure, those errors are distributed
across the suspect and the fillers (Wells et al., 2015b). In
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are lower in a fair lineup because there are other photo-
graphs that the witness might plausibly choose; correct
identifications of the guilty suspect also tend to be lower,
for the same reason.2 Despite claims made by Wells et al.
(2015c), the existence of filler siphoning has no bearing on
the appropriateness of ROCs for the analysis of eyewitness
identifications (see also Wixted & Mickes, 2015a, 2015b).
As we described earlier, including positive responses to
known innocent fillers on the x-axis of the ROC changes
what the ROC measures, as we elaborate next (see Wixted
& Mickes, 2015b for a detailed quantitative demonstration
of this point).
Using Wetmore et al. (2015) data, Wells et al. (2015c)
showed that the AUC is greater for fair than for biased
lineups when the ROC includes only positive responses to
the guilty and innocent suspects; these ROCs reflect wit-
nesses’ ability to discriminate guilty from innocent sus-
pects in the two tasks, indicating that higher-accuracy
decisions result from fair lineups. Wells et al. (2015c) also
showed that the AUC is lower for fair than biased lineups
when filler identifications are included in the false alarm
rate, producing an ROC that shows how well witnesses
can discriminate the guilty suspect in a TP lineup from
everybody in the TA lineup (a measure of questionable
value). The reason the AUC is higher for the biased
lineups in this analysis is that some of the fillers did not
look like the perpetrator in Wetmore et al.’s experiment
(Tredoux’s, 1998; E′ averaged 2.74). In contrast, in the fair
lineups, the fillers were more plausible candidates for
identification (E′ averaged 4.12), meaning that it was sim-
ply easier to discriminate the guilty suspect in the TP
lineup from all of the TA fillers in the biased case than in
the fair case. But as has been mentioned already, the fact
that the relative AUC changes depending on whether
positive identifications of known innocent fillers are in-
cluded on the x-axis of the ROC is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of interest: Which identification procedure best
distinguishes guilty from innocent suspects? As Wells
et al. (2015c) clearly showed, the AUC for that comparison
is larger for fair lineups.
One recent paper, by Lampinen (2016), has the poten-
tial to play an important role in the debate about diag-
nosticity and the AUC, because it appears to offer a
sophisticated modeling approach and has been inter-
preted as providing “strong additional evidence that
ROC analyses on lineups are not measures of discrimin-
ability” (Wells et al., 2015b, p. 316). Lampinen’s analyses,
if correct, would present a challenge to ROC analyses of
eyewitness identifications. For this reason, we respond to
his criticisms in detail in the next two sections, showing
them to be faulty. In the third section, we evaluate
Bayesian measures of eyewitness performance and show
that they reflect a complex mixture of truediscriminability of guilty from innocent suspects, re-
sponse bias, and the probability that a guilty suspect is
presented to the witness. Finally, we conclude by consid-
ering the potential value of identification ROCs for de-
velopment of better theories of eyewitness memory and
decisions.
Lampinen’s ROC criticisms
Using simulated data, Lampinen (2016) argued that ROCs
derived from lineup and showup identification procedures
produce different estimates of witnesses’ ability to discrim-
inate guilty from innocent suspects even if their true level
of discrimination accuracy does not vary. This point, if
correct, would raise questions about ROC-based compari-
sons of the accuracy of lineup and showup identifications
(Gronlund et al., 2012; Mickes, 2015; Wetmore et al.,
2015). However, we will show that Lampinen reached an
erroneous conclusion because he simulated data using
relatively liberal criterion locations and inappropriately ap-
plied signal detection equations from a different decision
task. Lampinen’s second criticism of ROCs is that they en-
courage researchers to compare discrimination accuracy
at different levels of witness confidence, which “is not a
reasonable or scientifically valid way to compare two con-
ditions” (Lampinen, 2016, p. 28). As we will argue, this
claim fails to recognize the most valuable contribution of
ROCs, which is exactly that they eliminate the need to
worry about witness confidence because the same decision
accuracy (d′) is reflected at every confidence level.
1. In contrast to Lampinen’s (2016) claim, ROCs provide
the best measures of underlying discrimination perform-
ance and may be compared across lineups of different
lengths (including showups).
Lampinen (2016) argued that witnesses’ ability to dis-
tinguish guilty from innocent suspects appeared to be
different for showup and lineup procedures that involve
ROCs, so “pAUC analyses do not provide a valid way of
comparing identification procedures” (Lampinen, 2016,
p. 26). As evidence, he offered a series of simulations in
which true discrimination accuracy (d′) was equated for
two different identification tasks: showups and six-
photograph lineup identifications. In both cases, Lampi-
nen assumed an underlying representation based on sig-
nal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
Specifically, memory strength values were sampled from
Gaussian strength distributions with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 for fillers, and a mean of d′ (set
at 0.5, 1, 1.5, or 2)3 and a standard deviation of 1 (for
equal variance simulations) or 1.2 (for unequal variance)
for guilty suspects.
To simulate the showup procedure, Lampinen ran-
domly selected a single value from either the guilty sus-
pect distribution, to represent a TP showup, or the foil
Fig. 1 Simulated receiver operating characteristic curves (ROCs)
assuming true d′ = 1.5 and equal variance Gaussian distributions for
five different recognition memory tasks. The larger gray square shows
an area under the ROC (AUC) = 0.01; the smaller gray square shows an
AUC= 0.001. Points marked with a red open circle are the operating
points simulated by Lampinen (2016); points marked with a blue filled
circle are the operating points that result from a decision criterion of
1.00 in the showup and six-person lineup tasks. 2AFC = two-alternative
forced choice
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strength was compared with a fixed set of criterion
values (0.18, 0.23, 0.27, 0.39, 0.67, 1.15, and 1.53) to as-
sign a confidence level for the response. For example, a
sampled strength of 1.0 would be assigned a confidence
level of 6 because it falls in the interval between the fifth
and sixth criterion locations. Any sampled strength
greater than 0.18, the lowest criterion, was assumed to
result in a positive identification.
Simulation of the six-photograph lineup procedure
was similar, except that each simulated lineup
involved six sampled strengths, either one from the
guilty suspect distribution and five from the filler
distribution (for a TP lineup) or all six from the filler
distribution (for a TA lineup). In either case, the
highest sampled strength determined the confidence
rating. If that strength was from the guilty suspect
distribution, then a “hit” resulted. If the lineup
included only fillers, then any strength above the low-
est criterion (0.18) was treated as a false alarm. Be-
cause there are six opportunities for a filler to exceed
the criterion in a TA lineup, the resulting response
rates were divided by 6.
Lampinen (2016) showed that the simulated ROC for
the showup procedure fell above the simulated ROC for
the lineup procedure for each of the true d′ values he con-
sidered. Because the AUC is a measure of subjects’ ability
to discriminate between two types of stimuli (i.e., guilty
and innocent suspects; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005), he concluded that the estimated accuracy
was higher for the showup method. As a consequence, his
simulations seem to suggest that the AUC fails to provide
a good measure of eyewitnesses’ ability to discriminate
guilty from innocent suspects. We will show, using our
own simulations, that ROCs based on a choice from
among a larger set of options (i.e.,
six-person lineup rather than three-person one) do have
lower hit and false alarm rates at every criterion location,
though for reasons quite different from those offered by
Lampinen. However, the difference in the AUCs (which
Lampinen did not report) is inconsequential compared
with the difference in AUCs when true discrimination ac-
curacy (d′) actually varies.
We performed simulations similar to Lampinen’s so that
the AUCs could be calculated. To extend and generalize
his analyses, we varied the criterion locations continuously
for 10,000 different simulated trials of each type, thus
mapping out the full theoretical ROC. By comparison,
Lampinen assumed a particular set of fixed criterion loca-
tions, which necessarily provides only a snapshot of the
ROC. In addition, we assumed several different lineup
sizes (2, 3, or 6). Although lineups with only two or three
photographs are not used in standard police procedures,
their inclusion in our simulations does provide someinsight into the relationship between lineup size and form
of the ROC.
Our simulated showup and lineup ROCs are shown as
the set of ROCs in Fig. 1 that are represented with
dashed functions. These curves were generated using
one of the combinations of parameter values from Lam-
pinen’s study, namely a true d′of 1.5 and equal variance
distributions. (Other values of true
d′yielded similar results.) Notice that these four ROCs
are visually indistinguishable at the lowest false alarm
rates (up to about 0.10) that reflect the highest confi-
dence levels. This part of the ROC was not shown in
any of Lampinen’s simulations, because the most conser-
vative criterion he selected was relatively liberally placed
and thus produced high hit and false alarm rates overall.
The operating points in Lampinen’s simulations are
marked with red open circles on the showup ROC in
Fig. 1.
The highest-confidence identification decisions are
those that are most valuable to the legal system because
they carry the greatest probative value (Wixted, Mickes,
Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). High-confidence identifica-
tions are much more likely to be correct than low-
confidence identifications (e.g., Carlson, Dias, Weather-
ford, & Carlson, in press; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman,
1996; Mickes, 2015; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh,
2013; Wixted et al., 2016), and jurors are more likely to
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1988). Thus, the highest-confidence and most important
region of the showup and six-person lineup ROCs are
visually indistinguishable when true accuracy (d′) is
equated. Lampinen’s selection of particular, relatively lib-
eral decision criteria obscured this similarity.
At lower levels of confidence, or more liberal response
biases, it becomes apparent that the number of response
options affects both the hit and false alarm rates. The false
alarm rate is limited for the obvious reason that selection
of any of the fillers in a TA lineup is an error; chance re-
sponse rates are properly limited to 1/N, where N is the
lineup size. The basis for the decrease in the hit rate with
increasing lineup size is perhaps less obvious. Because wit-
nesses select the photograph that is most familiar (assum-
ing it exceeds some criterion), the greater the number of
fillers in a TP lineup, the more likely it is that one of them
will have greater familiarity than the guilty suspect just by
chance. In that case, the witness would choose a filler in-
stead of the guilty suspect, thus reducing the hit rate. A
consequence of these two effects is that the very same evi-
dence values in memory, used in conjunction with identi-
cal criterion locations, can nonetheless result in hit and
false alarm rates that are reduced as the number of photo-
graphs in the lineup increases. For example, the blue circles
in Fig. 1 show the hit and false alarm rates that result when
witnesses have a true d′value of 1.5 and use a decision cri-
terion of 1.00 for both showup and six-person lineup deci-
sions: Their decisions appear more conservative in the
lineup task simply as a consequence of the number of pho-
tographs presented (both memory and the decision process
are identical).
To estimate the area under the curve for each of the
ROCs shown in Fig. 1, we used the R package pROC
(Xavier et al., 2011). Because the maximum false alarmFig. 2 Simulated partial area under the receiver operating characteristic cu
three different levels of true discrimination accuracy (d′). Left panel: Fmax = 0
estimated with 2000 bootstrapped samplesrate is limited by the lineup size, we actually estimated
the pAUC for the showup and six-person lineup ROCs
(those compared visually by Lampinen) using a false
alarm rate range of 0 to either 0.10 (only the highest-
confidence responses) or 0–0.16 (essentially the full
ROC for the six-person lineup). To obtain confidence
intervals on these area estimates, we repeated this
process using 2000 bootstrapped samples for each iden-
tification procedure and true accuracy level (d′), select-
ing the pAUCs at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles as the
lower and upper bounds of the 95 % confidence
intervals.
Figure 2 shows that the difference in pAUCs for show-
ups and six-person lineups is trivial when true accuracy (d′)
is equated.4 The differences typically appear in the fourth
decimal place (i.e., less than the size of the smaller gray
square in Fig. 1). In contrast, when true accuracy (d′) var-
ies, the pAUC for both showup and six-person lineup
identifications capture those changes quite readily. Figure 2
shows that with a true accuracy difference of 1.0 d′units,
pAUC changes are obvious for both showup and lineup
decisions (i.e., approximately twice the size of the larger
gray square in Fig. 1). Thus, contrary to Lampinen’s con-
clusion, we observe that the AUCs obtained from showup
and six-person lineup identifications may be safely com-
pared empirically: They yield indistinguishable estimates
of discrimination accuracy when true accuracy (d′) is held
constant and change appropriately (and quite similarly)
when true accuracy varies.5
Of course, these simulations assume witnesses are
equally good at discriminating guilty from innocent sus-
pects in showup and lineup tasks. On one hand, they
show that, theoretically, if discrimination accuracy (d′) is
the same, the ROCs are highly unlikely to suggest that
either of the procedures results in higher-accuracyrve (pAUC) for showup and six-person lineup identifications assuming
.10; right panel: Fmax = 0.16. Error bars are 95 % confidence intervals
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tions also show that real differences in discrimination
accuracy (d′) can be detected with ROCs, and to the same
degree for both showups and lineups. Whether accuracy
is actually the same in these two identification proce-
dures is an empirical question, not a theoretical one.
Empirical comparisons of ROCs for showup and lineup
identifications have consistently revealed that showups
result in significantly lower decision accuracy than
lineup procedures, as measured with pAUC (Gronlund
et al., 2012; Mickes, 2015; Wetmore et al., 2015). Our
simulations suggest that the most appropriate conclu-
sion to draw from these studies is that showup identifi-
cation accuracy is inferior to lineup identification
accuracy. (See Wixted and Mickes [2014] for a possible
theoretical explanation of that difference.)
The other published ROC comparisons of eyewitness
identifications are safe from Lampinen’s criticism as well.
Lampinen’s basic claim was that varying the length of
the lineup (from six to one) affected estimated but not
true witness accuracy, but the primary application of
ROCs to eyewitness identification decisions has been to
compare sequential and simultaneous presentation of
the same lineup photographs. The consistent finding,
that pAUC for simultaneous lineups is equal to or
greater than for sequential procedures (Carlson & Carl-
son, 2014; Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Gronlund et al.,
2012; Mickes et al., 2012), is not in any way challenged
by Lampinen’s arguments, because the same lineup
length (indeed, the same lineup) was used for both pro-
cedures. Thus, the ROC data indicate that, if anything,
there is a simultaneous superiority effect; we will revisit
this issue in the final section of this paper, where we dis-
cuss the implications of ROC data for theoretical devel-
opments in eyewitness identifications.
Finally, note that the “proof” offered by Lampinen
(2016, Appendix) of the relationship between estimated
discrimination accuracy from lineups and showups is ir-
relevant because that math applies for a different task,
namely a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task. In a
2AFC task, participants are shown a target and a lure
and must choose the target. The decision is usually
modeled as one of taking a difference between the two
(independent) memory strengths, and thus the distribu-
tion of interest becomes N(d′, √[12 + s2]), where s is the
standard deviation of the guilty suspect distribution.6
The resulting ROC, again for a true d′ of 1.5 and s = 1,
is shown as the solid curve in Fig. 1. This is not the
ROC simulated by Lampinen, nor is it the same ROC
that occurs for lineups of size 2 (see Fig. 1). Participants
in an eyewitness identification task have the option of
rejecting the lineup entirely, which may change the
underlying task from one of comparison (as in 2AFC) to
one in which the subject must simply identify thestrongest item that exceeds a minimum criterion (DeC-
arlo, 2013). Comparisons of ROCs from different tasks
should involve careful consideration of the decision pro-
cesses and memory evidence involved, as we will show
in the final section of this paper.
To summarize, Lampinen’s first criticism misses the
mark in several important ways. It is irrelevant to the
comparison of sequential and simultaneous lineups that
has dominated the eyewitness ROC literature, and it
reaches the unfounded conclusion that estimated accur-
acy (pAUC) differs systematically for showups and
lineups. Our analyses demonstrate that the two para-
digms yield essentially identical estimates of perform-
ance when the true accuracy level (d′) is equated. Thus,
Lampinen’s argument does not change either the empir-
ical conclusion that simultaneous lineups yield equal or
greater AUCs than sequential lineups (Carlson & Carl-
son, 2014; Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Gronlund et al.,
2012; Mickes et al., 2012), or that showups yield lower-
accuracy identifications than lineups of either type
(Gronlund et al., 2012; Mickes, 2015; Wetmore et al.,
2015). Our comparison of showup and six-person lineup
ROCs confirms that these ROC analyses provide accur-
ate information about relative performance.
2. Lampinen (2016) claims ROCs invite inappropriate
comparison of accuracy at different levels of response
bias. In truth, ROCs separate bias from discrimination
accuracy.
Lampinen’s (2016) second major claim is that ROCs
invite comparison of memory accuracy across different
levels of confidence. As an example, he selects a particu-
lar false alarm rate, say, 0.167 (see Lampinen, 2016,
Fig. 6), and then observes that the hit rates vary for dif-
ferent simulated identification procedures, suggesting
that different estimates of accuracy (say, d′) would be ob-
served for lineup and showup identifications. Finally,
Lampinen notes that if response bias differs across iden-
tification procedures, then the operating points being
compared may reflect different degrees of witness confi-
dence. Conversely, Levi (2016) worries that witnesses
given different identification procedures may respond
with the same confidence level despite having different
discrimination accuracy (d′).
These criticisms completely miss the value of ROCs,
namely that each ROC reflects the same accuracy
(d′) at every point. Because of this property of ROCs, one
can readily see both accuracy and response bias effects
simultaneously: Curves higher in the space reflect higher
(d′) decision accuracy (though possibly not meaningfully
so, as our simulations demonstrate), and points toward
the lower-left end of the curve reflect more conservative
responses. One does not need to compute a single-point
measure of accuracy, such as d′, at a given false alarm
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one should not do so, because
d′is confounded with response bias whenever the under-
lying evidence distributions have unequal variance, as is
consistently observed in recognition memory judgments
(e.g., Ratcliff, Gronlund, & Sheu, 1992). This mistake has
led to substantial interpretation errors in a variety of
memory experiments (e.g., Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Ev-
ans, Rotello, Li, & Rayner, 2009; Verde & Rotello, 2003).
It is important to understand that every “single-point”
measure of decision accuracy, be it d′, percent correct,
diagnosticity, or something else, has an associated theor-
etical ROC. The theoretical ROC for a given measure
simply connects all combinations of hit and false alarm
rates that yield the same accuracy value according to
that measure, regardless of differences in response bias.
However, the various single-point measures of accuracy
each predict a different ROC form, which means that re-
searchers who ignore differences in response bias across
conditions may easily (and erroneously) conclude that
accuracy differs if they select an inappropriate accuracy
measure (see Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010, and Rotello,
Masson, & Verde, 2008, for detailed explanations). For
example, for a constant value of diagnosticity, D =H / F,
it is easy to see that the theoretical ROC, H =D × F, is a
line with an intercept of 0 and a slope equal to the diag-
nosticity value itself. Rotello, Heit, and Dubé (2015,
Fig. 1) plotted several such theoretical ROCs for diag-
nosticity and compared them with the empirical ROCs
reported in a study of eyewitness identifications (Mickes
et al., 2012, Experiment 1b). The empirical ROCs were
curved, not linear, meaning that different empirical re-
sponse biases would yield different estimated diagnosti-
city despite actually representing the same underlying
discrimination accuracy (d′). For this reason, diagnosticity
is not an appropriate measure of eyewitness identifica-
tion accuracy (nor for any other task of which we are
aware; see Swets, 1986a).
When the empirical and theoretical ROCs do not
match, as for the empirical identification ROCs and the
diagnosticity measure, a different accuracy measure
must be selected; otherwise, estimated accuracy and re-
sponse bias are confounded (Rotello et al., 2008; Swets,
1986b; Wixted & Mickes, 2012). For this reason, Lampi-
nen’s claim that ROCs and probative value measures
such as diagnosticity provide redundant information (p.
32; see also Levi, 2016, p. 45) is simply incorrect unless
response bias is the measure of interest. As Fig. 3 shows,
diagnosticity varies systematically with response bias but
is uncorrelated with any particular AUC. Importantly,
the greatest variability in diagnosticity estimates occurs
for the most conservative response biases (i.e., those
with larger positive values of the signal detection meas-
ure c) that yield the high-confidence responses that aremost useful to the legal system (e.g., Wixted et al.,
2016).
In summary, ROCs do not “invite” inappropriate com-
parisons of performance across different response biases.
Instead, they make explicit if and how response bias dif-
fers across empirical conditions, and they yield a meas-
ure of response accuracy (AUC) that is independent of
response bias. In contrast, single-point measures, such
as
d′, percent correct, and diagnosticity, both obscure and
are almost invariably confounded with differences in re-
sponse bias.
Bayesian measures of eyewitness identification
Bayesian measures of eyewitness identification decisions
have also been proposed (Wells & Lindsay, 1980) and are
argued to offer quite specific quantitative information
about the probability that a suspect is guilty. The authors
of one recent paper (Wells et al., 2015a) presented an ana-
lysis of the relative amount of information gained from an
identification decision (either positive or negative) under a
range of different conditions, such as whether the lineup
was conducted using a sequential or simultaneous proced-
ure or whether the fillers were similar or dissimilar to the
suspect. The information gain they reported is the differ-
ence in the probability that the suspect is actually guilty
before and after an identification (or lineup rejection) oc-
curs (i.e., the difference in the prior and posterior prob-
abilities of guilt). The information gain curves they
reported vary over the probability that the lineup includes
a guilty suspect (i.e., the base rate of TP lineups) and as a
function of witness confidence.
What is missing in the discussion of these Bayesian
measures is any acknowledgement that the posterior
probability of guilt, and consequently the information gain
curves, also depends on the underlying ability of witnesses
to discriminate guilty from innocent suspects (d′) in each
task. For example, Wells et al. (2015a) interpreted the
lower information gain provided by a suspect identifica-
tion when the filler photographs are dissimilar rather than
similar to the suspect as indicating that the lineup is sug-
gestive of guilt—a biasing effect that would tend to in-
crease both true and false identifications. Of course, it is
also possible that the presence of highly similar foils sim-
ply makes the memory task harder, decreasing witnesses’
ability to discriminate guilty from innocent suspects. In-
deed, Clark’s (2012) meta-analysis suggests that both re-
sponse bias and discrimination accuracy (d′) change as a
function of filler similarity. The posterior probability of
guilt and information gain plots do not allow us to distin-
guish between these two interpretations of the data: Both
discrimination and response bias contribute to each curve.
Similarly, Wells et al. (2015a) noted that greater
Fig. 3 Left panel: Diagnosticity (hit rate/false alarm rate) as a function of true area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC = 0.6, 0.7,
0.8, or 0.9). For each AUC level, the false alarm rate varies from 0.01 (more conservative) to 0.99 (more liberal); given each false alarm rate and
AUC, the hit rate is determined by H =Φ[√2 z(AUC) + z(F)]. Right panel: For the same AUC, hit rates, and false alarm rates, diagnosticity is plotted
as a function of response bias [measured with c = −0.5(zH + zF)]
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sequential rather than simultaneous lineup. Given that se-
quential lineups result in lower AUCs (e.g., Mickes et al.,
2012), this effect is most likely due to the well-
documented response bias differences that these two pro-
cedures induce (e.g., Clark, 2012).
To demonstrate the problem of interpreting informa-
tion gain curves and posterior probabilities, we gener-
ated hit and false alarm rate pairs under the assumption
of two different true discrimination levels (d′ = 1.0 or
1.5), each with two different response biases or confi-
dence levels that were selected for illustrative purposes.
We then used those data to calculate the posterior prob-
ability of guilt and the information gain curve for each
combination of discrimination and bias; these are dis-
played in Fig. 4. It is apparent in Fig. 4 that both greater
discrimination and a more conservative response bias
(or higher confidence level) result in greater information
gain from a positive identification. The condition with
lower true discrimination of guilty from innocent sus-
pects may nonetheless yield greater information gain
from a positive identification if the response bias is con-
servative. This effect may explain the information gain
curves derived from sequential and simultaneous lineups
(Wells et al., 2015a).
Information gain curves and posterior probabilities of
guilt reflect a combination of the probability that a guilty
suspect is presented to the witness (base rate of TP
lineups), the witness’s willingness to identify someone
(response bias or confidence), and the true discrimin-
ation potential provided by the identification procedure.
As we have seen, ROCs provide the best way ofindependently assessing response bias and witness dis-
crimination of guilty from innocent suspects.ROCs provide constraints on theory development
In this final section, we suggest some directions for the
field in which ROCs might play a particularly important
role. As Lampinen (2016) also noted, the field needs a
process model of eyewitness identifications. Clark’s (2003)
WITNESS model provides a good starting point that is
grounded in the broader literature on memory modeling,
and we hope that additional work with WITNESS and al-
ternative models will be forthcoming. However, the ab-
sence of an influential and broadly applied process model
is not an argument against the use of ROCs. Indeed, we
would argue that ROC data offer essential constraints on
the development of any process model of eyewitness iden-
tifications, just as they have constrained development of
process models of recognition memory more generally
(e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon, 1991; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997).
To demonstrate some of the potential of ROCs for
both constraining theory development and guiding deci-
sions about experimental paths to pursue or to avoid, we
simulated a few different decision strategies that have
been proposed in the literature. The simulated data were
then used to generate the ROC that would result if that
hypothetical decision process were used; in principle,
these theoretical ROCs can be compared with empirical
data. This approach can be particularly useful for elimin-
ating potential decisional processes from further consid-
eration if, for example, the theoretical ROC fails to
correspond to empirically observed ROCs.
Fig. 4 Bayesian measures of eyewitness identification decisions.
Lower panel: Posterior probability of guilt after suspect identifications
(solid curves) and filler identification or lineup rejections (dashed
curves) for two levels of true discrimination and various response
criteria. Upper panel: Information gain (posterior probability of guilt
− base rate) for the same data. Bias is defined by the location of the
decision criterion in standard deviation units (e.g., d‘ + 1 indicates a
criterion located 1 standard deviation above the mean of the guilty
suspect distribution mean)
Fig. 5 Simulated receiver operating characteristic curves using three
possible decision rules in a six-person simultaneous lineup with true
d′ = 1.5. Absolute rule: The strongest item above criterion is selected.
Relative rule: The strongest above-criterion item is selected if it
exceeds the next best item by a minimum amount (here, 0.15 d′
units); otherwise, the lineup is rejected. Guess if small rule: Same
as the relative rule, except that the witness is assumed to guess
if the difference between the two strongest items is too small
(<0.15 d′ units)
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that have been proposed for identification decisions in a
simultaneous lineup procedure, namely the absolute
strength rule, in which the strongest above-criterion
photograph is selected (Clark, 2003; Lampinen, 2016), and
a relative strength rule, in which an identification is made
only if the strongest above-criterion photograph exceeds
the next-best photograph by some amount (Clark, 2003;
Davey: Absolute and relative decision rules in eyewitness
identification, unpublished dissertation). If the two stron-
gest items both exceed the criterion but their difference is
too small to allow identification, then the witness could ei-
ther guess (identifying one of them at random) or reject
the lineup. We considered both variants.
For these simulations, we used the same sampling
process as we described previously. For TP lineups, one
value was sampled from a normal distribution with a
mean of d′ = 1.5 and a standard deviation of 1, and fivevalues were sampled from a distribution with a mean of
0 and standard deviation of 1; for TA lineups, six values
were randomly sampled from an N(0,1) distribution.
This sampling process was repeated 10,000 times. The
criterion location was varied in small steps over a wide
range; for the relative decision rules, the minimum dif-
ference in strengths was arbitrarily set to 0.15, one-tenth
the true discrimination value. The results, shown in
Fig. 5, suggest that empirically distinguishing these three
possible decision rules is likely to be difficult or impos-
sible: The ROCs are essentially identical, except that the
two relative decision rules result in responses that ap-
pear ever so slightly more conservative than those based
on the absolute rule. This effect is a consequence of the
decision rule itself: The same evidence values and re-
sponse criteria were used in all three simulations.
In our second simulation, we compared a six-person
simultaneous lineup task with a sequential identification
procedure using the same sampled evidence values.
Simulation of the simultaneous task was identical to that
used to generate Fig. 1: An absolute decision rule was
used. In the sequential task, we assumed that our “wit-
nesses” were asked to make a yes-or-no identification
decision for each individual in the six-person lineup
using a set of simple rules: Any strength above criterion
resulted in a positive identification, a positive identifica-
tion ended the procedure, and only a single “lap”
through the photographs was allowed. The presentation
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domized for every simulated lineup, and the response
criterion was varied across a wide range of possible
values to allow us to map the entire ROC. The results
are shown with the black functions in Fig. 6 for d′ = 1.5.
Although the simulated simultaneous lineup ROC
looks quite similar to those observed empirically (e.g.,
Mickes et al., 2012), the simulated “first-identification-
only” sequential lineup ROC has a surprising nonmono-
tonic form. As the criterion becomes more liberal, both
the hit and false alarm rates increase, but only to a point:
Once the criterion is too liberal, positive identification of
filler items in the TP lineup increases, which ends the
trial without allowing a correct identification to occur.
Because there are five filler items in the TP lineup, there
is a high probability that at least one of them will appear
earlier in the sequence than the guilty suspect does,
resulting in an ironically reduced hit rate at more liberal
criterion locations. (This part of the ROC is shown in
red; in this region, the criterion location is placed no
more conservatively than d′/2.) In the limit, if the criter-
ion is set so low that any photo is given a positive re-
sponse, then the hit rate must simply equal the
probability that the guilty suspect appears first in the se-
quence, or one in six for our simulated six-person
lineups. Importantly, the same memory strengths were
used on both simulated lineup tasks, and thus true dis-
crimination of guilty from innocent suspects is equatedFig. 6 Simulated receiver operating characteristic curves for sequential
and simultaneous (Sim) six-person lineups assuming true d′ = 1.5. An
absolute decision rule was used for the simultaneous lineup: The
strongest above-criterion item was selected. Two versions of the
sequential task were simulated, one in which the first tested
item to exceed criterion was identified, at which point the trial
ended (Seq, 1st ID), and the other in which the trial continued after
an initial identification; subsequent identifications of stronger items
were allowed (Seq, any)for these ROCs. The curves diverge only because of dif-
ferences in the specific decision processes we simulated.
How do we interpret the results of our second simula-
tion? Although the resulting ROCs appear to imply that
the AUC will be lower for sequential than for simultan-
eous lineups, that conclusion holds only if witnesses make
decisions exactly as we simulated in each task—fixed cri-
terion location for each trial, no changes in criterion
placement as additional photographs are shown, absolute
decision on each photo, completely randomized photo-
graph order, and the same criterion location and true d′
value for every witness. Of course, experimental condi-
tions and “real-world” identification procedures will vio-
late these assumptions, if for no other reason than
individual witnesses surely have different memory abilities
and response biases (e.g., Kantner & Lindsay, 2012).
It is also common for sequential lineup identification
tasks to allow both experimental and actual witnesses to
see the sequence of photographs more than once (e.g.,
Horry, Brewer, Weber, & Palmer, 2015; Wells, 2014),
and changing that aspect of the simulation changes the
resulting theoretical ROC. The blue dashed function in
Fig. 6 shows the ROC that results derived from a se-
quential identification task in which the witness is
allowed to make more than one identification; the iden-
tified photograph that has the strongest match to mem-
ory is selected as the final choice. This sequential lineup
simulation, in which any identification of the guilty sus-
pect counts as long as it is stronger than any previously
identified filler, yields an ROC that looks exactly like the
simultaneous lineup ROC. Thus, we conclude that the
detailed comparison of sequential and simultaneous
lineup ROCs depends heavily on exactly the method-
ology used in administering the lineups and conducting
the simulations.
We hope that these examples demonstrate the power
of simulation work in the context of eyewitness ROCs:
Assumptions about memory and decision processes can
be made explicit and tested against data. Precisely this
sort of simulation and data-fitting process has been in-
strumental in development of theory in the broader lit-
erature on memory (e.g., Clark & Gronlund, 1996;
Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), and we have every reason to
believe that it offers the same advantages in the subfield
of eyewitness identifications. Wixted and Mickes (2014)
provided a first step in that direction; we hope that
others will follow their lead.
Conclusions
The resolution of the debate about whether diagnosticity
or AUC provides a better measure of witnesses’ ability to
discriminate between guilty and innocent suspects is
clear. The empirical data are inconsistent with the meas-
urement assumptions of diagnosticity, and consistent
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This fact alone is sufficient to eliminate diagnosticity
from consideration as a measure of witness discrimin-
ation accuracy: Diagnosticity and response bias are com-
pletely confounded.
The criticisms of ROC-based interpretations of eyewit-
ness identifications are in many cases simply wrong: The
area under the curve really does measure discrimination
accuracy (d′) and does not provide information that is re-
dundant with diagnosticity. ROCs do not “compare hit
rates after equating false alarm rates” (Lampinen, 2016, p.
32). Thus, we believe the ROC-based conclusion that
showup identifications yield lower-accuracy decisions than
lineup identifications is well-founded (Gronlund et al.,
2012; Mickes, 2015; Wetmore et al., 2015), as are the con-
clusions that there is certainly no evidence for a sequential
lineup advantage and that there may actually be a simul-
taneous advantage (e.g., Mickes et al., 2012). Other ROC
criticisms are simply irrelevant: Filler siphoning, cost-
benefit analyses, and the base rate of TP lineups do not in-
fluence the AUC that summarizes the accuracy of suspect
identifications. Continued argument along these lines will
serve only to hinder research progress.
ROCs eliminate the need to worry about possibly dif-
fering biases across test conditions because, by defin-
ition, they have the same discrimination accuracy (d′) at
all possible response biases. This clear advantage of
ROC analyses has fueled theoretical advances in other
domains, including recognition memory (Dougal &
Rotello, 2007; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997), metamemory
(Benjamin & Diaz, 2008; Masson & Rotello, 2009), rea-
soning (e.g., Dube et al., 2010; Heit & Rotello, 2014),
medical diagnostics (e.g., Metz, 1986), veterinary medi-
cine (e.g., Gardiner & Greiner, 2006), weather forecasting
(e.g., Mason & Graham, 2002), and machine learning
(Furnkranz & Flach, 2005). There is every reason to be-
lieve that ROC analyses will be just as important to un-
derstanding eyewitness identification decisions.
Endnotes
1When discussing the diagnosticity ratio, Wells and
Lindsay (1980, p. 778) stated that “Functionally, an iden-
tification of a foil is treated as a nonidentification as is a
witness’s choice of making no identification from the
lineup (i.e., exercising a none-of-the-above option).”
2As we will see in the discussion of Fig. 1, these reduc-
tions in the hit and false alarm rates due to filler siphoning
occur even if witnesses’ decision criteria and memory evi-
dence are identical.
3d′ is the distance between the means of the target
and lure distributions, measured in units of their shared
standard deviation. If the distributions have the same
variance, then d′ reflects subjects’ discrimination of tar-
gets and lures. If the distributions do not have equalvariances, then d′ is confounded with response bias and
should not be used.
4Our conclusions are restricted to the specific model that
we, and Lampinen (2016), simulated. Different assumptions
could result in different ROCs, a point we revisit in more
detail when we consider how ROCs could constrain theor-
etical development in the eyewitness domain.
5To be sure that our conclusions did not depend on
the particular d′ values we selected, we reran these
pAUC simulations for 16 levels of d′ (from 0.25 to 4.0 in
increments of 0.25). For d′ < 3.0 (a high limit for eyewit-
ness identification accuracy), even these small incre-
ments in d′ resulted in observable differences in pAUC
for both lineups and showups. For d′ ≥ 3.0, the confi-
dence intervals grew quite wide. The comparisons of
pAUC for showup and lineup identifications at a given
d′ were similar to those shown in Fig. 2.
6The proof is taught in elementary statistics courses:
The distribution of the difference between two inde-
pendent random variables, x ~N(μx, σx) and y ~N(μy,
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